Comments on Gedicks and Ball by Tushnet, Mark V.
 
Comments on Gedicks and Ball
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Mark Tushnet, Comments on Gedicks and Ball, 4 Notre Dame J.L.
Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 457 (1990).
Published Version http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol4/iss3/5/
Accessed February 16, 2015 5:47:34 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12954338
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAANotre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 4
Issue 3Symposium on Religion Clauses
Article 5
1-1-2012
Comments on Gedicks and Ball
Mark Tushnet
Follow this and additional works at:http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information,
please contactlawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark Tushnet,Comments on Gedicks and Ball, 4Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y457 (1990).
Available at:http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol4/iss3/5COMMENTS  ON  GEDICKS AND  BALL
MARK  TUSHNET*
In April  1989 the newspapers  revealed  an incident involv-
ingJustice O'Connor that sheds light on the arguments offered
by Professors  Gedicks and Ball.  In response to a request from
a political acquaintance in Arizona, Justice O'Connor sent a let-
ter listing three Supreme Court cases that, she said, "held"  that
"this  is a  Christian nation."'  One of them, from  1892, did say
that;'  another  says  nothing  of the  sort.3  It  is  the  third  that
interests  me.  The  citation Justice  O'Connor  provided  was  to
Zorach v.  Clauson, which I remembered  for the celebrated  state-
ment  by  Justice  Douglas  that  "[w]e  are  a  religious  people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme  Being. '
Justice O'Connor's  letter is  revealing,  particularly  in  light
of her opinion  in Lynch  v.  Donnelly,5  where  she came  close  to
saying  that no reasonable Jew could  fairly  regard  a  municipal
creche  as a  statement  that Jews  were  outsiders  to the political
community.6  Consider this version  of what happened:  Justice
O'Connor  is  of  course  familiar  with  Zorach,  and  she
remembered  its  statement  about religion.  When  she remem-
bers a statement that "we  are a religious people,"  it is retrieved
by her memory as  "we  are  a Christian  people,"  because, after
all, the equation  in her mind  between religion and Christianity
is  entirely natural; indeed,  I suggest  that Lynch  shows  that she
has  to  think  very hard  to  imagine  that  religion  encompasses
more  than Christianity,  as  when  she  is  hit  over  the  head with
the point in  Goldman v.  Weinberger.7
*  Georgetown  University Law  Center.
1.  See Dershowitz,Justice  O'Connor's Second Indiscretion, N.Y.  Times, Apr.
2,  1989,  at  § 4,  31,  col.  2.
2.  Church  of the  Holy  Trinity  v.  United  States,  143  U.S.  457,  471
(1892).  But see id. at 470 ("this  is  a religious nation")  (emphasis added).
3.  McGowan  v.  Maryland,  366  U.S.  420  (1961).
4.  343 U.S.  306, 313  (1952).
5.  465  U.S.  668,  693  (1984)  (creche  "cannot  fairly  be understood"  to
convey message of governmental endorsement of Christianity) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
6.  It  might  be  unwise  to  make  too  much  of  the  letter,  for Justice
O'Connor may have relied  on  sloppy  research  by someone;  one  news  story
hinted that she copied a  letter that ChiefJustice  Burger had  written.
7.  Goldman  v.  Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 528-33  (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
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I  recount  this  incident  not  to  score  points  on  Justice
O'Connor, but rather to identify  a more general  problem that
affects discussions of religion and public policy, the topic of our
principal papers.  The problem is this:  In these discussions it is
awfully  difficult  to avoid talking about religion in general.  Sec-
ularists  of a  certain  sort  denounce  the impact  of religion  on
public  policy because,  in  their  view,  all  religions  are  basically
irrational  throwbacks to a pre-Enlightenment  era and are there-
fore  fundamentally  inconsistent  with  the  personal  traits  that
they think desirable in citizens  of a post-Enlightenment democ-
racy.  Religionists-a terrible word, but I have come up with no
other-of a certain sort approve the impact of religion on pub-
lic policy because when they say religion  they mean the kind of
religion  of which  they approve:  the  Catholic  bishops but  not
Jerry  Falwell, or Jerry  Falwell but not the Catholic bishops,  or
Jerry  Falwell  and the  Catholic  bishops  but  certainly  not  the
Ayatollah Khomeini,  and  so on.8
The real problem,  though, is that religion in our society is
highly  diverse.  This  was brought home to me in  reading Pro-
fessor Gedicks's paper, which struck me as offkey in a couple of
ways.  The  first  was  his  definition  of religion  as  holistic  and
compelling.  My reaction  to that  was, "Well,  sure it  is  to some
people some of the time.  But, to be frank, that's not how being
Jewish feels to me even though, as  I have written in a review of
Kent Greenawalt's book, so far as I can  tell I am a Jew down to
the ground." 9  To the extent  that his analysis  is  predicated  on
the  particular  view  of religion  that  he  advances,  then,  I  am
bound  to find something  odd about it.
Even more, our national politics are shot through with reli-
gion-not  Bellah's  civil  religion,  but honest-to-goodness  real
religion.  Yet,  as  we  all  know,  the  religion  that  pervades  our
politics  tends to be exceedingly watered down, not holistic and
compelling,  precisely  because  that's  the  way  religion  is  in  the
United States these days.  That is, the denatured version of reli-
gion  that  pervades  our  political  culture  is  not  primarily  the
direct  consequence  of political choice.  Rather,  it results  from
the combination  of two factors.  First, the lived religious  expe-
rience of many people  is actually denatured.  Second, in a relig-
iously  pluralist  society,  politicians  who  seek  to  appeal  to
majority  views  necessarily  move  to  the  center,  which  in  this
8.  An  interesting  discussion  of  this  point  is  provided  by  Evans,
Contradictory Demands on  the First Amendment  Religion  Clauses:  Having It  Both
Ways,  30J.  CHURCH  &  ST. 463  (1988).
9.  Tushnet, Religion in Politics (Book  Review),  89  COLUM.  L.  REV.  1131,
1131  (1989).COMMENTARY
context means  that they attempt  to capture that which  is com-
mon  to  the religious views  of a majority of the people.  Neces-
sarily,  moving  to the center  strips  the hard  edges  off religious
experience  and gives religion in  its public appearances  a dena-
tured cast.
The  second  difficulty  I had  was in  identifying  the  terrible
secularism  about  politics  that  troubles  Professor  Gedicks.  It
just does  not  seem to  me that,  as  a general  matter, there  is a
conventional  wisdom  that  assumes  that  "religious  incursions
into politics  [pose]  great social and political dangers.""0  From
my vantage point,  our political  life  is  shot  through  with overt
expressions  of  religious  motivation:  the  Catholic  bishops,
Archbishop Tutu and his influence on the anti-apartheid move-
ment in  the  United States, Jesse Jackson,  Martin  Luther  King,
Jr., or, as  Professor Ball emphasized,  George Bush's  inaugural
address.  There is no doubt, of course, that there are some peo-
ple  who see  such activities  as dangerous, but after all,  this  is  a
large  country,  and  you  are  likely  to  find some  people  finding
almost anything dangerous.
Two possibilities may account for Professor Gedicks's per-
ception.  First, while our politics are pervaded  by religion and
by the  intervention  of religious  figures, some  important  intel-
lectuals are actively hostile to that sort of thing."  Second, cer-
tain  religious  groups  are  evidently  "alienated,"  as  Professor
Gedicks  puts  it,  from  the  present  state  of things,  at  least  as
respects the law of church and state.  Yet, from his description
and  my  sense  of things,  there  is  another  hypothesis  that,  it
seems  to  me,  better accounts  for  that alienation.  Simply put,
that hypothesis  is  that people are alienated,  to the extent  that
they  are,  because  they  simply  have  not managed  to get  their
way.  And, frankly, politics  being what it is-a process in which
10.  Gedicks,  Some  Political  Implications of Religious Belief, 4  NOTRE  DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB.  PoL'Y  419, 425  (1990).
11.  Without having done a systematic survey,  I would guess that, if that
is  so,  it  results  from  an  important  religious  phenomenon,  the
disproportionate presence ofJews in intellectual circles in the United  States.
(Another  source  of hostility  to  religious  interventions  in  politics,  at  least
historically, was  the position of Baptist and other evangelical churches.  That
has changed somewhat recently, and in any event I doubt that there are many
serious  and  committed  Baptists  in  the  group  of important  intellectuals  to
which  I refer.)  And it has been an important strand in Jewish thinking about
religion  and politics  to  defend  a  strong strict separationist  position, on  the
ground,  not surprisingly,  that given the  numerical and  historical position of
Jews in Christian society, anything other than  strict separation  is  unlikely to
be good for the Jews.  For additional discussion, see infra text accompanying
note  13.
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somebody wins  and  somebody  loses,  and  that's  the breaks-I
doubt that there  is anything normatively problematic about the
fact  that  some  people  have  not  been  able  to  persuade  other
people  to go along with them.
The point would be different if we could identify important
areas  of law  in  which  the people  had  indeed  been  persuaded
but had  not been  able  to  get  their  way  because  the Supreme
Court  blocked  the  implementation  of  their  program.  Of
important  issues  on  the  religious  agenda,  though,  school
prayer is probably the only one about which that could be said,
and  even  there  the  evidence  appears  to  be,  as  Professor
Gedicks  notes,  that  in jurisdictions  where people  actually  do
want their kids  to pray in school-rather than simply mouthing
off  about  the  Supreme  Court-their  children  do  pray  in
school.' 2  The abortion issue is a  more complex one from this
perspective,  but  I  suggest  that  many  anti-choice  people  are
going to be surprised and disappointed in the medium-to-long
run after the Court overrules Roe v.  Wade.  They have had a free
ride on the issue until now, but when they actually get down  in
the  trenches  and  have  to  fight out the adoption  and  enforce-
ment of restrictive  abortion laws,  they are going  to lose more
than they expect.  The implication of this suggestion  is that, as
a matter of fact,  the  present state of affairs  with  respect  to the
availability  of abortion  in  practice  is  rather close  to  what  the
people of the country  as  a whole  desire, although  perhaps  the
people would like to reach that state of affairs  by a slightly dif-
ferent route.  If I am right, even with the abortion issue we may
not have an example of a policy that the people  want  to adopt
but cannot because of the  Supreme Court.  In any event,  I  am
not sure  that  the  abortion  issue is  one  that  is  deeply relevant
here, because  it  is  surely  impossible  to contend  that  the  issue
has  been  relegated  to  secular  and  therefore  dissatisfying  or
alienating discussion.  Again,  it  is not so much that  the discus-
sion  is  secular  than  it  is  that  the  anti-choice  people  have  not
been able  to get their way.  No matter what one's overall polit-
ical  orientation,  one  is  going  to  find  some  religious  activities
sometimes  having a beneficial  effect on politics, and some reli-
gious activities  sometimes  having an adverse  one.
That leads me to a point I mentioned  earlier, about plural-
ism,  and  therefore  to  Professor  Ball's  paper.  As  Professor
Gedicks acknowledges  toward the end of the paper,' 3 one diffi-
culty  in  being  enthusiastic  about  religious  interventions  into
12.  Gedicks,  supra note  10,  at 437.
13.  Id. at 435.COMMENTARY
politics  is  that  one's  allies  on  one  issue  often turn  out  to  be
rather  unattractive  when  one turns  to another  issue,  and, dis-
turbingly,  they  are  unattractive  there  in  the  very  thing  that
commends  them, the depth  of their commitment  to  their own
religion and therefore, all  too often, their hostility to and intol-
erance of adherents of other religions.  Professor  Ball's discus-
sion  of  the  distinction  between  normal  religion  and-to
continue the Kuhnian metaphor-revolutions  in religious  poli-
tics suggests some of the difficulties that we would have to con-
front.  Not only does religion serve as consolation for victims as
well  as legitimation  for the powers  that be,  it also provides  the
rhetorical  and spiritual resources  for resistance  to the existing
order.  But, as  Professor Ball  says,  when religions struggle for
space  in  the  public  sphere,  they  can  not  only  disrupt  the
existing  order  but  establish  their  own,  as  against  the  order
sought  by adherents of less  successful  religions.
What  this  suggests  to me,  as  do Professor Gedicks's  con-
cluding  comments  about  the risks  of the infusion  of real reli-
gious  commitments  into the public sphere,  is  that we  may not
be as badly off as both of the papers seem to suggest.  The criti-
cal  tone  of the  papers  offers  us  a  dilemma.  If we,  or at  least
other  people,  are  serious  about  religion,  we  run  the  risk  of
intolerance.  Yet, if we, or at least other people, are not serious
about  religion,  we present  a vision  of the world  in which reli-
gion, which for some people has been and can be an important
source of insight and inspiration, is  so trivial  as to be unattrac-
tive  or,  as  Professor  Ball  suggests,  blasphemous.  Perhaps,
though,  the  dilemma  is  not as  pointed  as  all  that.  As  I  have
said,  I  think  that  Professor  Gedicks  overstates  the degree  to
which  our public  life  has  become  completely  secularized.  At
the same  time,  I agree  with him,  and with Professor Ball's  dis-
cussion  of normal  religion,  that  the  religion  that  does  in fact
affect our public  life is  pretty  diluted, at least when  compared
with  the  idea  of a  holistic  and  compelling  set  of  religious
beliefs.  Yet,  it may be that in a world of religious  pluralism-a
world in which one ought not read "We are a religious people"
as  "We  are a Christian  nation"-that  is basically a good  thing.
Justice O'Connor's  slip,  if it signifies  more than  sloppiness  on
her part,  symbolizes  for me why  I  am  nervous  about religious
interventions into politics, even when, as  with the bishops'  pas-
toral letters on nuclear policy and on the economy,  I agree with
the substance of the positions.  But, and here I conclude,  in this
nervousness  I  think  I  am  in Professor  Gedicks's  company,  for
his  "risks"  seem  to  me  the  same  as  my  "nervousness."  The
difference  between  us  is  simply  that we  seem  to come  at  the
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problem  from  different  directions,  his  enthusiasm  about reli-
gious interventions  into politics  being tempered  by his  aware-
ness of those risks, and my skepticism about such interventions
being offset by my appreciation of the complex role of religion
in  the  actual  lives  of  the  people  of the  religiously  pluralist
United States.